INVASION OF EAST TIMOR IN 1975 UNJUSTIFIABLE

Timorlorosaenacao http://www.timorlorosaenacao.blogspot.com/

By Maubere Tuba Ai Metin

There was and is not concerning the simple matter of relationship. It was and it is still arise between DRET and RI the main problem of the genocide war committed by ABRI towards the fate of the hundred thousand of innocent East Timor's People during the invasion, occupation and illegal annexation from year 1975 till 1999.

Indonesia’s 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor was justified by the growing communist threat and security concerns along the countries’shared border,it was purely baseless and reckless argument that do not convince the international public opinion over the cruelty that Indonesia had practised in Maubere's People Homeland DRET during the illegal occupation and annexation period of the almost 25 years over.

The paragraph where Mr.Bantarto Bandoro, a researcher at the Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), pronounced over the mentioned Article 51 of the United Nations Charter gave a country the right to exercise “anticipatory self-defense” through military action if it deemed there were apparent threats to its security.

The above mentioned article 51 of UNC is loudly very clear that if the Indonesia or any other country around world should have fully right to exercise anticipatory self-defense through military action or other legal means in order to defend its sovereignty's integrity in case of any suspicious plant of the invasion intentionally moved by other nation, suppose this concrete case, if the DRET had intentionally with malefic intention to treat the stability and security of its neighbour nation RI. But at the contrary RI was the invader of DRET, in this case how Bantarto Bandoro could interpreted the mentioned article in his nation's favor??? It is completely ironic and absurd and it will never convince any idiot gay as Bantarto Bandoro attempt defrauding international public opinion.

Except Indonesia servants Xanana, Horta and Lasama could accept their masters' trickery and unfair games, but Bantarto Bandoro will never deceive Maubere People with your very nice singsongs. The Maubere People continue demand Bantarto Bandoro's government through UN and influential leaders NON or GO Organizations around the world in order pressure Indonesia's Government to abide the international demands in order to deliver the culprits, authors of the hideous crimes against humanity in East Timor's Soil to the light of justice as accordingly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Geneva Convention protagonized bu UN.

If Bantarto Bandoro mechanically transport the case of the Iraq and comparison with East Timor's invasion moved by his nation, it is purely false, because the problem of Iraq was very clear that at the beginning Iraq had ambitions in invaded the Kuwait illegally. Therefore the International had backing Kuwait People and Nation to take severe action by military means to repel Iraq invaders from Kuwait. Here the international public opinion should understand very well about the Iraq problem and the mentioned article 51 of the UNC pronounced by Bantarto Bandoro it was compatible in very legal manner without any objection by UN members.

E.Timor may force election

Dili, Sep 18, 2009 - East Timor's opposition threatened on Friday to force an early election in an escalating row with the government over the release of an Indonesian militia leader accused of crimes against humanity.

Fretilin party spokesman Jose Teixeira told AFP the party will 'seriously consider' pulling out of parliament if a motion to censure the government of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao is not passed by parliament.

Fretilin, which controls 21 of the parliament's 65 seats, submitted the motion on Monday over the Gusmao government's decision last month to release militia leader Martenus Bere.

'We can't continue to be a part of what has become a violation of law,' Mr Teixeira said.

'If the censure does not go through, we can't see any way out,' he said, adding the withdrawal of Fretilin's MPs would be enough to automatically force an election.

Bere was arrested after crossing into East Timor on August 8, five years after being indicted for his role in a string of human rights violations including the 1999 Suai church massacre in which up to 200 people were killed.

The United Nations' human rights representative in East Timor on Tuesday criticised government 'interference' in freeing the militia leader. But Gusmao and President Jose Ramos-Horta have said reconciliation with giant neighbour Indonesia is more important than dwelling on past abuses.

At least 100,000 people were estimated to have died during Indonesia's 24-year occupation of East Timor, which ended with bloody violence surrounding a 1999 UN-backed independence vote. (AFP)

UN condemns East Timor militia leader’s “release”

Dili, 1 September 2009 (AFP) - The United Nations condemned Tuesday the reported release of an Indonesian former militia leader accused of taking part in a massacre of civilians in East Timor in 1999.

"If the reports are true, his release is contrary to the Security Council resolutions which set up the UN Mission in (East Timor) and seriously undermines the global principle of accountability for crimes against humanity," Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's spokeswoman Marie Okabe said in a statement.

The UN said earlier this week that the suspect, Martenus Bere, had been released Sunday ahead of national celebrations commemorating 10 years since East Timor won independence from Indonesia in a UN-backed referendum.

The government has refused to confirm Bere's release amd the UN appeared to backtrack on Tuesday, saying in a separate statement that its mission in Dili was "not in a position to comment" on Bere's circumstances.

Bere was detained in East Timor on August 8, five years after being indicted for his role in the 1999 Suai Church massacre, in which up to 200 people were killed.

"The UN's firm position is that there can be no amnesty or impunity for serious crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide," Okabe said.

"In that context, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights strongly opposes the release of someone for whom an arrest warrant of this nature has been established."

East Timor's leadership has been criticised for opposing prosecution for those responsible for abuses during Indonesia's bloody 1975-1999 occupation of the half-island, which killed around 100,000 people.

President Jose Ramos-Horta says restoring good relations with Indonesia is more important than "prosecutorial justice", and has said he will not let his country be used as an "experiment" in international justice.

The opposition Fretilin party however says he is out of touch with the East Timorese people, many of whom continue to demand justice for gross human rights abuses committed during the Indonesian occupation.

EAST TIMOR'S MARI ALKATIRI RECALLS TURBULENT DECADE

August 29, 2009/The Jakarta Globe

Ezki Suyanto

As East Timorese celebrate the 10th anniversary of the referendum that led to the country’s independence, the Jakarta Globe presents contributor Ezki Suyanto’s interview with the nation’s first prime minister, Mari Alkatiri, 59, at his residence in Farol, Dili, at the end of last month.

When you stepped down in 2006, you said there had been intervention from outside. What did you mean?

I have no doubt. I still have no doubt. It’s clear to me that there was a conspiracy. It started in mid-2005 when the Australian media began to damage my image. The Australian government at that time was really a conservative government.

It was clear that they were aware that after 2006, with oil and gas revenues, I could do much better for this country. So this had to be stopped and they succeeded in getting sympathy and support from inside the country, even from Xanana [Gusmao]. The crisis was an internal confrontation between the prime minister and the president of the republic.

The president and the police were against the government because he failed to get support from the F-FDTL (Timor Leste Defense Forces, also known as Falintil) which also covers the police.

Is it the reason you say you do not want to be prime minister anymore?

A strong government needs a strong political party behind it. So it would be much better to have the leader of the party working full time for the party then to be too busy in the government. It does not mean that I won’t help the government, of course I’ll do it. I have made it clear to the central committee that I am not ready to go back, that the party needs to be strong.

Fretelin is the majority party and has a simple majority in Parliament with 29 percent of the seats. Why isn’t Fretilin in power?

It is a very peculiar situation in this country, in which some people do not respect the will of the people. The leaders think that they are stronger than the will of the people.

Leaders like Xanana Gusmao and Ramos-Horta think they are stars who will be stars all the time.

Recently, you initiated a referendum for another election. Why?

I made the suggestion. We will introduce a bill for discussion at the Parliament. This is constitutional. We cannot just sit and do nothing until (election year) 2012. We do not recognize the legitimacy of the government, but above all the situation is very bad, particularly in the economy, and corruption is everywhere.

Even though we are pushing for an early election, we have to do it through legal and constitutional means. You cannot really repeat the 2006 scenario, using violence as a tool for political gain. We need to put an end to this culture of violence, to have peace and a culture of democracy.

We have been doing campaigns and we go to grassroots meetings, spreading this message: no more violence. We need to respect our constitution and our laws.

Ten years after the referendum and seven years after independence, what is your reflection on East Timor?

Up and down. We started on the right path but had a lot of problems. People are unaware that development takes time. Combatting poverty cannot just be done overnight, and we had to face the crisis in 2006.

The mistakes are not of those at the grassroots level, but of the leadership. Some leaders dream they can do better in a short time, and that is the reason we really had to face the crisis. Now, we are regressing, particularly in institution-building as people start to dismantle everything that had been carefully constructed.

Now, we have to face a lot of problems, such as rampant corruption, for the simple reason that the system that was built has been really destroyed by the current government. We got our independence, but we could have done much better, particularly two or three years afterward when we got money from oil and gas resources.

How long will East Timor depend on the international community?

The United Nations can stay here for not more than another two years, but for foreign troops and police, it is time to leave. We needed them in 2006 when troops and police were in conflict. If you have the army on one side and police on the other, you cannot do anything.

I invited foreign troops to come, but now there is no longer such confrontation, so it’s time for them to leave. Some police and army trainers can stay.

There’s still a long way to go in developing this country, yet you have refused loans from groups such as the International Monetary Fund. Why?

I was always aware that sooner or later we would have revenue from oil and gas, so what are the loans for? It would only generate corruption. A state is like a big company. You need to improve the quality of your administration.

DON'T TRAIN INDONESIA'S DEADLY KOPASSUS

(please spread the word!)

Sign the Petition - http://www.gopetition.com/online/29600.html

Indonesia's Special Forces (Kopassus), more than any other in the Indonesian military, stands accused by the Indonesian people of some of the most egregious human rights violations.

The history of Kopassus human rights violations, its criminality and its unaccountability before Indonesian courts extends back decades and includes human rights and other crimes in East Timor, Aceh, West Papua and elsewhere. The crimes of Kopassus are not only in the past. A recently published Human Rights Watch report details ongoing Kopassus human right violations in West Papua.

In 2008, the Bush administration proposed to restart U.S. training of Kopassus. the State Department legal counsel reportedly ruled that the ban on training of military units with a history of involvement in human rights violations, known as the Leahy law, applies to Kopassus as a whole.

See the letter signed by more than 50 U.S. organizations opposing training for Kopassus: http://www.etan.org/news/2009/07kopassus.htm. Additional background about the crime of Kopassus here: http://www.etan.org/news/2008/04brikop.htm.

27 july 2009

Support ETAN - DONATE Today! Go here: http://etan.org/etan/donate.htm

East Timor/TRIALS BEGIN OVER 2008 HORTA-GUSMAO “ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT”

18 july julio 2009/World Socialist Web Site http://www.wsws.org/

By Patrick O’Connor

Dual East Timorese and Australian citizen Angelita Pires is now on trial, facing a series of charges relating to last year’s so-called assassination and coup attempt against the country’s Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and President Jose Ramos-Horta. The court, which convened last Monday, has heard the prosecution allege that Pires is guilty of attempted murder and conspiring to kill the president on the grounds that she was the “indirect author” of these events.

Initial proceedings have underscored the numerous unanswered contradictions and far-reaching political interests involved in the events of February 11, 2008.

The official account, first promoted by the Timorese government and the Australian media and now advanced by Pires’s prosecutors, is that Alfredo Reinado—Pires’s partner and former military-police commander—had led his men in an unsuccessful coup attempt and was killed after attacking Ramos-Horta and his security detail. Along with Pires, 23 ex-soldiers and 4 of their associates, including Reinado’s senior colleague Gastao Salsinha, are on trial. President Ramos-Horta has suggested that he may pardon the men. (Tem piada, não tem?)

The official account is unsupported by the evidence and believed by virtually no-one in East Timor. Based on what is now known, it is almost certain that Reinado and his men were lured into Dili, after being told they had an appointment for a discussion with Ramos-Horta, in order to be executed. The World Socialist Web Site was alone in raising this possibility immediately after the February 11 events.

Pires has rejected the charges laid against her. Her Australian barrister Jon Tippett, QC has said that the trial highlights the disastrous state of the Timorese legal system, which he described as “one of the most substantial failures that the United Nations has ever engaged in”.

Pires’s legal team received access to the prosecution’s voluminous files just days before the trial opened, rather than the months normally granted to allow adequate preparation. “I’m very concerned about it being a fair trial,” Tippett told the ABC, “because I’ve now had complete access to 25 volumes of the prosecution case and there is no substantive evidence or properly admissible evidence that could possibly support any of the charges that have been brought against her. Now in those circumstances I would expect any responsible prosecuting authority to withdraw these charges against her at the earliest opportunity. The fact that the case is still going to trial gives me concern that this is not a legal case, it’s a political case.”

Significantly, Tippett has indicated that he intends to prove Pires’s innocence by demonstrating that Reinado was killed after attending what he believed was a meeting arranged with Ramos-Horta. “The evidence seems to point to a different story to the one which people have been receiving through the media and certainly from sources in the government of Timor-Leste to date,” the lawyer told Timorese newspaper Tempo Semanal. “The [real] story seems to be one of Reinado coming to meet the president and in the course of that event he’s shot at extremely close range ... in what appears to be an assassination.”

Prosecutors last week attempted to have Tippett and Pires’s other senior counsel, Brazilian Zeni Arndt, thrown out of court on the grounds of their alleged lack of standing in Timor’s legal system. The two lawyers were told to sit in the viewing gallery for part of the first day’s proceedings, but the presiding judge ultimately decided to permit them to participate.
Pires’s defence lawyers have said they may call 150 witnesses, likely resulting in court proceedings lasting several months.

The trial has the potential to prove highly damaging to both the Timorese and Australian governments. The immediate questions raised by the charge that Reinado was set up for assassination is: who was responsible and what was the motivation? In line with the legal adage cui bono?—who benefits—suspicion must firstly fall upon forces around Gusmao as well as Australian personnel in Dili and Canberra.

Reinado, Gusmao, and the Australian governmentBorn in 1967, Reinado fled Indonesian-occupied East Timor for Australia in 1995. He returned during the country’s transition to formal independence and joined the newly created armed forces; from 2003 to 2005 he spent several months studying and training with the Australian army in Canberra. Then in May 2006, as commander of a platoon of military police, Reinado and his men joined the mutiny of a section of the army known as the “petitioners”, who had rebelled against the Fretilin government led by Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.

The exact circumstances leading up to the split in the military remain unclear, but there is evidence suggesting that then President Xanana Gusmao was centrally involved in preparing the provocation as a means of destabilising the Alkatiri administration. Gusmao had been openly siding with the most right-wing sections of the Timorese elite, who were opposed to the Fretilin government—including former Indonesian militia members, criminal gangs, larger landowners, and the powerful Catholic Church.

The Australian government was also a leading participant. It seized upon the petitioners’ uprising to dispatch more than one thousand Australian and New Zealand soldiers to the impoverished state as part of a calculated regime-change operation. The media played an especially foul role, with the ABC’s “Four Corners” program promoting baseless accusations that the prime minister had formed a hit squad to assassinate his opponents. Alkatiri eventually acquiesced to the pressure, and chose to hand over power in June rather than risk a popular movement against the coup plotters developing beyond Fretilin’s control.

Reinado enjoyed close relations with both Gusmao and the Australian forces. After he had taken up arms against the elected government, and killed several security force personnel in a vicious ambush in Dili, Gusmao wrote Reinado a friendly letter encouraging him to withdraw his men from the capital. The president subsequently paid for Reinado’s hotel bill when the soldier stayed in the central town of Ailieu for six weeks. During this time the “rebel” held talks with high-ranking Australian military personnel and was feted in the Australian media as a “folk hero” heading a popular movement against the government.

What followed was a series of murky episodes that pointed to the close ties between Reinado and Australian military and intelligence personnel. In July 2006, Portuguese police arrested the former soldier in a Dili house, which he had used to store weapons and which was located directly opposite an Australian military base. A few weeks later Reinado was somehow able to walk out of a prison that Australian and New Zealand troops were responsible for guarding. In March 2007, shortly after a proposed deal on Reinado’s surrender—negotiated with Gusmao and Ramos-Horta—fell through, the Australian government deployed 100 elite SAS troops to lead a raid on Reinado’s base in the central mountain town of Same. The former major was again somehow able to evade detention, walking away from the clash unscathed. Later, after Gusmao and Ramos-Horta called off the official manhunt, Reinado and the Australian army exchanged information about each other’s movements—using Angelita Pires as the go-between.

The turning point in Reinado’s various manoeuvres came in January 2008, when he released a DVD accusing Gusmao of being behind the 2006 crisis, and threatened to provide additional details in future statements. Reinado’s damning allegation, apparently triggered by a breakdown in negotiations with Gusmao over the terms of his surrender, exacerbated the crisis of the prime minister’s unstable coalition government.

On February 7 last year, President Ramos-Horta convened a meeting of parliamentarians from both government and opposition parties to announce his support for Fretilin’s demand for new elections, which Gusmao was bitterly resisting. Canberra no doubt also viewed with extreme alarm the prospect of another national vote, having expended significant resources, firstly in ousting Alkatiri in 2006, and then in assisting the coming to power of the Gusmao government through the 2007 parliamentary elections held under Australian military occupation.

Ramos-Horta scheduled further discussions on the question of a fresh election—but these were never held. Reinado was killed just four days after the initial meeting. His death fortuitously eclipsed the threat that Gusmao’s true tole in the 2006 crisis would emerge. Moreover, Gusmao seized on the so-called coup attempt to announce a “state of siege”, under which he assumed sweeping authoritarian powers. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd meanwhile rushed to dispatch another 190 soldiers and federal police, bolstering the increasingly unpopular Australian occupation force.

There was, therefore, ample reason for both Gusmao and Canberra to want Reinado eliminated. On the other hand, no-one has ever provided a plausible explanation as to why Reinado would want to kill Ramos-Horta. Certainly prosecutors in the Pires trial have so far provided no motive. The president had visited Reinado in mid-January and agreed to a secret amnesty deal that would see the former major avoid imprisonment in return for surrendering his arms and returning to Dili. Ramos-Horta, in other words, was Reinado’s best—and last—hope of securing his freedom.

Prosecution contradictions: There are countless outstanding questions regarding the events of February 11. How did Reinado and his men avoid detection by Australian troops and police as they travelled as an armed convoy up to President Ramos-Horta’s residence? Did Australian intelligence agencies have prior knowledge of what has being planned, given that Reinado made dozens of mobile phone calls, including to Australia and Indonesia, in the days before his death? Did the alleged ambush on Gusmao’s vehicle, led by Reinado’s associate Gastao Salsinha, actually take place, or was it a staged fraud, as Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri has alleged?

A full and comprehensive account of what happened may never emerge; critical evidence was deliberately sabotaged in the aftermath of Reinado’s shooting. The bodies of Reinado and Leopoldino Exposto were moved and tampered with by Timorese police and soldiers, Reinado’s clothing was removed, his mobile phone used, and his weapon interfered with. The rifle used to shoot Reinado and Leopoldino from point-blank range has never been properly examined.
The prosecution’s case has already begun to unravel, after just five days of court proceedings.
Reinado’s fellow “rebel”, Marcelo Caetano is accused of shooting President Ramos-Horta. This is despite Ramos-Horta himself previously telling the media that Caetano was not responsible. “Marcelo Caetano was wrongly accused,” the president told the Age in October last year. “I never said it was him. It was a media beat-up.”

This “media beat-up” is now the central pivot upon which the prosecution apparently hopes to build its case. Two of Ramos-Horta’s guards testified this week that the gunman who shot Ramos-Horta was wearing a balaclava at the time. One, Pedro Soares, said he could not identify the man because his face was hidden, but the other, Isaac da Silva, insisted that the attacker was definitely Caetano and that he recognised him, “from the way he was standing and his attitude”. Lawyers for the accused noted that da Silva’s testimony contradicted his earlier statement to investigators in which he said that he had not recognised the gunman. Also unexplained is the contradiction between the prosecution’s charge that Ramos-Horta’s attacker was wearing a balaclava with the president’s statement, again made to the Age last year, that he had seen the gunman’s “face and eyes” immediately before the shooting.

Ramos-Horta, who has issued numerous statements against Pires in the lead up to the trial, is now remaining silent.

Ex-army admits: Conspiracy Xanana Gusmao and Mahidin Simbolon

DARK SIDE OF PRESIDENT OF EAST TIMOR

Jakarta, 6 September 2004/ timoronline, 26 agosto 2008

There was a commotion in the editor’s office this morning with the presence of a man with the initials JM . The man who admits to being ex-army of the Satu Kompi Brawijaya Division and appeared keen to admit that, due to feelings of frustration and stress, ongoing for years, he could no longer keep quiet about the connection with the involvement of the military operation ABRI/POLRI (TNI/POLRI-red) in East Timor from the year 1994 to the end of 1996.

The journalists of this magazine were confused by this gentleman. However, after several minutes the ex member of ABRI started to explain to the GATRA correspondent about several involvements in the killing operation of several important figures of the pro freedom movement of East Timor which ran from 1994 to 1996.

Here the magazine correspondent was not very surprised with the information, as it was already an open secret that in the mid 90s the war in East Timor was being stoked by ABRI/POLRI (TNI/POLRI-red) on several of the East Timor guerrilla defence basis or as they are better known by their ABRI term, GPK-Fretilin.

However, the story became very different and surprising when ex-sergeant JM (who has to keep his name secret for the safety of his family) explained all the ABRI operational documents to do with the Front Clandestin and East Timor Armed Force.

The main target of the operation was the leader of the Front Clandestin organisation who at that time was led by his commander Keri Laran Sabalae. One thing which was very interesting and also sensational was the dilemma of the military operation which was directly under the command of Colonel Mahidin Simbolon (Simbolon’s rank at the time) with the cooperation with Xanana Gusmao, the “resistance leader” of East Timor, who was incarcerated in LP Cipinang Jakarta.

Ex-sergeant JM said that he himself was present at the meeting between Colonel M. Simbolon which was conducted in a room of the Lembaga Permasyarakatan Cipinang in Jakarta.

The basis of the meeting was the desire and the readiness of Xanana Gusmao to “centralise” radical groups into an East Timorese resistance organisation body which, according to Xanana, could threaten the efforts of the “quiet resistance” and reconciliation with diverse East Timor political groups who were being hurried along to unify the people of East Timor.

Because of this, Xanana Gusmao was ready to work together with Col. M Simbolon to annihilate the radical groups of “GPK Fretilin” which among others consisted of several commandants of the Fretilin movement and its followers with names Rodak Timur, Keri Laran Sabalae, David Alex, Konis Santana and Eli Fohorai Boot.

These names were inserted very clearly in a military operation document appendix 1994-1996 which was unfolded by ex-sergeant JM. The core of the “cooperation” between Xanana’s camp and M. Simbolon was the principle of mutualism: Simbolon could achieve success in his military career and Xanana would even become more flexible in controlling the resistance movement which he commanded from LP Cipinang.

It seems clear indeed that the president of the new East Timor was very cunning in maintaining the importance of his group by exterminating his own commanders, who were deemed disloyal to him or even if loyal, according to Xanana they over- prioritised the “violent path” to reach national goals.

Seen from the documents and the various photographs in the possession of JM, it is very difficult to doubt the origin of this story. This is the hidden version and the dark side of the “charisma” of Xanana who was so exalted by his own people. Working with the “enemy” to annihilate his own people.

Ex-sergeant JM himself says the burden he has carried for this time has become lighter with his admittance. He regrets deeply why the East Timorese president was so sly in order to victimise part of the members of his people for the importance of his political strategy. Concerning Major General Simbolon, Serka (sergeant major), JM makes the appeal that the TNI/POLRI headquarters immediately investigate this case.

Because the nature of the military operation at that time secrecy from the unit which was led by Col. M. Simbolon. ABRI headquarters only obtained the military operation appendix copy after the defeat of several “GPK Fretilin”. “Because of this, Major General Purnawirawan Mahidin Simbolon must be immediately investigated remembering that ‘the stars on his shoulders’ of the general is the result of conspiracy with the enemy of the Republic of Indonesia at that time,” adds ex sergeant JM. [IY, GAT]

Imung Yuniardi (Semarang)

Law and Politics, Gatra Number 42, published Friday, 7 September 2004

***

ORIGINAL:

Eks Tentara mengaku: Konspirasi Xanana Gusmao dan Mahidin Simbolon

SISI GELAP SANG PRESIDEN TIMOR LESTE

Jakarta, 6 September 2004 14:45

Gatra dihebohkan dengan kehadiran seorang pria berinisial JM di kantor redaksi majalah pagi ini. Lelaki yang mengaku sebagai seorang eks tentara di Divisi Satu Kompi Brawijaya dan berpenampilan cepak tersebut mengaku sudah tidak dapat lagi meredam segala rasa frustrasi dan stress yang dideritanya beberapa tahun belakangan, berhubungan dengan keterlibatannya di operasi militer ABRI/POLRI (TNI/POLRI-red) di Timor-Timur pada tahun 1994 hingga akhir tahun 1996.

Para wartawan di majalah inipun binggung dibuat oleh lelaki tersebut. Akan tetapi menjelang beberapa menit kemudian sang eks anggota ABRI mulai memaparkan kepada koresponden GATRA mengenai berbagai kertelibatanya dalam operasi pembunuhan terhadap beberapa tokoh penting gerakan pro kemerdekaan Tim-Tim yang dilancarkan pada tahun 1994 hingga 1996.

Disini koresponden majalah ini tidak begitu kaget dengan informasi bersangkutan, karena memang sudah menjadi rahasia umum bahwasanya di pertengahan tahun 90an perang di Timor-Timur sedang hangat-hangatnya dilancarkan oleh pihak ABRI/POLRI ( TNI/POLRI-red) terhadap berbagai basis pertahanan kaum gerilya Timor-Timur atau yang lebih dikenal dengan istilah ABRInya sebagai kaum GPK-Fretilin.

Akan tetapi ceritapun menjadi lebih lain dan mengagetkan ketika eks Serka. JM (yang mengaku agar namanya tetap dirahasiakan-demi keselamatan keluarganya) membeberkan segala dokumen operasi ABRI ketika itu terhadap kaum Front Clandestin dan Armed Force Timor-Timur.

Sasaran utama dari operasi tersebut adalah pemimpin dari organisasi Front Clandestin yang waktu itu dipimpin oleh comandannya Keri Laran Sabalae. Suatu hal yang sangat menarik dan juga menhebohkan adalah sifat dilematis dari operasi militer itu sendiri yang dikomandai langsung oleh Kolonel Mahidin Simbolon (pangkat Simbolon pada waktu itu) dengan bekerja sama dengan “pemimpin perlawanan” Timor-Timur Xanana Gusmao yang sedang mendekam di LP Cipinang Jakarta.

Eks Serka. JM mengakui bahwa dirinya turut hadir dalam pertemuan antara Kolonel.M Simbolon yang dilaksanakan di suatu ruang di Lembaga Permasyarakatan Cipinang di Jakarta. Inti dari pertemuan tersebut adalah keinginan dan kesanggupan Xanana Gusmao untuk “menetralkan” kelompok-kelompok radikal dalam tubuh organisasi perlawanan Timor-Timur yang menurut Xanana dapat mengancam usaha “perlawanan damai” dan rekonsiliasi dengan berbagai kelompok politik Tim-Tim yang sedang dilancarkannya untuk mempersatukan rakyat Timor-Timur.

Oleh karena itu, Xanana Gusmao menyatakan bersedia bekerjasama dengan Kol.M Simbolon untuk membasmi kaum-kaum radikal di tubuh “GPK Fretilin" yang antara lain terdiri dari beberapa komandan gerakan Fretilin dan anak buahnya dengan nama Rodak Timur, Keri Laran Sabalae, David Alex, Konis Santana dan Eli Fohorai Boot.

Nama-nama tersebut tercantum dengan sangat jelas sekali di lampiran dokumen operasi militer tahun 1994-1996 yang dibeberkan oleh eks-Serka JM. Inti dari “kerjasama” antara kubu Xanana dan M Simbolon dalah prinsip mutualisme; Simbolon dapat sukses di karir militernya dan Xanana pun menjadi lebih fleksibel dalam mengontrol gerakan perlawanan yang dikomandai olehnya dari LP Cipinang. Terlihat jelas bahwsanya sang Presiden dari negara baru Timor Leste ini telah sangat lihai sekali untuk mempertahankan kepentingan kelompoknya dengan membasmi para komandanya sendiri yang dianggap tidak loyal kepadanya ataupun kalau loyal, menurut Xanana mereka lebih mengutamakan “jalan kekerasan” untuk mencapai tujuan nasional.

Melihat kepada dokumen-dokumen dan berbagai foto yang dimiliki oleh JM kiranya sulit sekali untuk meragukan keaslian dari versi cerita ini. Ini adalah versi tersembunyi dan sisi gelap “karisma” seorang Xanana yang begitu diagung-agungkan oleh rakyatnya sendiri. Bekerjasama dengan “musuh” untuk membasmi kaumnya sendiri.

Eks Serka. JM sendiri mengaku beban yang disandangnya selama ini menjadi lebih ringan dengan pengakuannya ini. Dia sangat menyayangkan mengapa Presiden Timor Leste ini begitu liciknya untuk mengorbankan sebagian dari anggota masyarakatnya hanya untuk kepentingan dari strategi politiknya. Mengenai Mayjen. Simbolon, Serka. JM memhimbau agar Mabes TNI/POLRI harus segera menyelidiki kasus ini. Karena sifat dari operasi militer pada waktu itu adalah rahasia dari unit yang dipimpin oleh Kol.M Simbolon.. Mabes ABRI hanya mendapatkan copy lampiran hasil operasi militer setelah tewasnya beberapa komandan “GPK Fretilin”. "Oleh karena itu, Mayjen Purnawirawan.Mahidin Simbolon harus segera diselidiki mengingat “bintang- bintang di bahu” sang jenderal adalah hasil konspirasi dengan musuh Republik Indonesia pada saat itu" demikian Eks Serka JM. [IY, GAT]

Imung Yuniardi (Semarang)
[Hukum dan Politik, Gatra Nomor 42, beredar Jumat, 7 September 2004

Australian Defense Forces operating illegally in East Timor

ADF Operating Illegally In East Timor

Thursday, 20 September 2007, 2:51 pm

Press Release: AID Watch

Fonte e destaques no texto: Timor Online, Quinta-feira, Setembro 20, 2007

Independent aid watchdog Aid/Watch today revealed that the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) in Timor Leste have been operating illegally, leaving ADF personnel open to criminal prosecution. The parliament of Timor Leste has not ratified an agreement by which the ADF was invited into the country.

AID/WATCH Co-director Flint Duxfield commented: "This is yet another example of how the Howard government's heavy handed approach to regional security and lack of regard for the laws of neighbouring states is likely to further exacerbate tensions in the pacific. The police component of the Enhanced Cooperation Program for Papua New Guinea fell over precisely because of this sort of illegality."

Aid/Watch member Dr Tim Anderson recently returned from Timor Leste. He reports that two legal processes are in train which challenge the legal standing of the ADF.

"A confidential legal opinion has confirmed that, as the Timor Leste Parliament has not ratified the May 2006 invitation for the ADF to enter the country, their presence as an armed force is illegal" said Dr Anderson.

This may have implications in two court cases. The first is a challenge in Suai from the families of four people killed by the ADF in April at Same, when they attempted to capture or kill army rebel Alfredo Reinado. Further, lawyers for Reinado have alleged ADF personnel executed two of the four men, by breaking their necks after they were captured wounded.

The second legal process is action by prosecutors and judges against Alfredo Reinado's group, which took part in armed rebellion and killings in May 2006. These prosecutors have also questioned the legal standing of the ADF.

The new Government of Timor Leste has suggested that dialogue is ongoing with the Reinado group, but independent international judges and prosecutors - lawfully exercising functions in the Timorese justice system - say the normal course of the law is being followed for these people, who are wanted for homicide and rebellion. A conflict may therefore be looming between the legal (prosecution-judiciary) and executive (President and ministers) branches of government.

However the Constitution of Timor Leste (Chapter II, sections 9 and 95.3) makes it clear that the National Parliament must approve international agreements and treaties, and that such agreements require full approval and official gazettal. This has not happened in the case of the initial invitation extended to the ADF.

"The legal consequence must be that the ADF carrying of arms, conducting searches, roadblocks and armed operations are illegal and subject to prosecution. Accusations of execution-style killings could also give rise to war crimes prosecutions" said Dr Anderson.

"The Howard government aggravated this problem in 2006, by refusing to submit the ADF to UN command. If Australian soldiers were under UN command today they would be protected by international law," said Dr Anderson.

On 26 May 2006 Timor Leste's President, Prime Minister and President of Parliament asked the Australian Government for an armed security force, to help deal with an armed rebellion and the collapse of the police. As events developed, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri was forced to resign and the Foreign Minister (now President) Jose Ramos Horta was installed as Prime Minister.

As the emergency situation abated, a new government was sworn in and a UN Security Council resolution was passed. There was then an expectation that the ADF presence would be legalised by the parliament. There were several opportunities for this but Prime Minister Jose Ramos Horta did not move on the matter.

On the other hand, the Howard Government defied both East Timorese and UN requests to place ADF personnel under UN command. Instead, the ADF presence was maintained under an assumption that it had the support of a bilateral agreement.

The closest the Parliament came to reviewing this agreement was on 8 November 2006, when they passed a resolution requesting their Government to (i) have all foreign forces placed under UN Command and (ii) take into account the views of the Parliament in agreements over the use of foreign troops. This has not been done.

"The ADF, so far, have chosen to ally themselves with the executive branch, and in particular with former President now Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao. In doing this they have alienated the largest political party Fretilin, which now accuses the ADF of playing partisan politics" said Dr Anderson.

However, with the two legal processes, there is a serious risk that ADF personnel and their commanders may be subject to criminal prosecution.

Those who doubt that there is an independent judiciary with the will to do this should recall that former government Minister Rogerio Lobato was imprisoned for illegal distribution of weapons. His defense was that he was helping defend the state during a crisis, when the police force had collapsed.

"ADF personnel would probably try a similar defense, if legally challenged. But their claim that they were acting under the orders of President Xanana Gusmao, when they attacked and killed members of the Reinado group at Same, may not be sufficient under East Timorese law."

Dr Anderson concluded: "the only way to limit the damage at this stage would be to either (i) place ADF personnel under UN Command or (ii) withdraw them from the country".