StoryJune 12, 2019, Democracy Now https://www.democracynow.org (USA) https://www.democracynow.org/2019/6/12/secret_files_show_how_brazils_elites?fbclid=IwAR2mG0CTGddfXhzoTZb_4efPUbi1BY2KyziwkrhocBAJsC7ud_KF73WbdZc
A political crisis is growing in
Brazil after The Intercept revealed that the judge who helped jail former
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva likely aided federal prosecutors
in their corruption case in an attempt to prevent Lula’s Workers’ Party from
winning the presidency. Leaked cellphone messages among Brazilian law
enforcement officials and other data obtained by The Intercept point to an
ongoing collaboration between Judge Sérgio Moro and the prosecutors
investigating a sweeping corruption scandal known as Operation Car Wash. Lula
was considered a favorite in the lead-up to the 2018 presidential election
until he was put in jail and forced out of the race on what many say were
trumped-up corruption charges. The leaked documents also reveal prosecutors had
serious doubts about Lula’s guilt. The jailing of Lula helped pave the way for
the election of the far-right former military officer Jair Bolsonaro, who then
named Judge Sérgio Moro to be his justice minister. We get an update from
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Glenn Greenwald of The Intercept, whose
reporting is based on a trove of internal files and private conversations from
the prosecutorial team behind Operation
Car Wash.Transcript This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: A political crisis is growing in
Brazil after The Intercept revealed that the judge who helped jail former
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva likely aided federal prosecutors
in their corruption case in an attempt to prevent Lula’s Workers’ Party from
winning the presidency. Leaked cellphone messages among Brazilian law
enforcement officials and other data obtained by The Intercept point
to an ongoing collaboration between Judge Sérgio Moro and the prosecutors investigating
a sweeping corruption scandal known around the world as Operation Car Wash.
Lula was considered a favorite in
the lead-up to the 2018 presidential election until he was put in jail and
forced out of the race on what many say were trumped-up corruption charges. The
leaked documents also reveal that prosecutors had serious doubts about Lula’s
guilt. The jailing of Lula helped pave the way for the election of the
far-right former military office Jair Bolsonaro, who then named Judge Sérgio
Moro to be his justice minister.
AMY GOODMAN: The Intercept's reporting is based on
a trove of internal files and private conversations from the prosecutorial team
behind Operation Car Wash. The Intercept has dubbed the files “The
Secret Brazil Archive.” As a result of The Intercept's reporting,
Brazil’s Supreme Court has announced it will reconsider an appeal by Lula to be
released from prison. Calls are also growing for Sérgio Moro to resign as
justice minister. The Brazilian Bar Association has called for Moro to be
suspended and for all prosecutors involved in the Car Wash scandal probe to be
disbanded.
Moro has denied any wrongdoing,
claims the messages have been taken out of context. Moro wrote in a statement,
quote, “I lament the lack of indication of the source of the person responsible
for the criminal invasion of the prosecutors’ cell phones. As well as the
position of the site that did not contact me before the publication, contrary
to basic rule of journalism. As for the content of the messages they mention, there
is no sign of any abnormality or providing directions as a magistrate, despite
being taken out of context and the sensationalism of the articles,” he said.
Vermont senator, 2020 presidential
candidate Bernie Sanders told The Intercept, “Today, it is clearer
than ever that Lula da Silva was imprisoned in a politicized prosecution that
denied him a fair trial and due process. During his presidency, Lula oversaw
huge reductions in poverty and remains Brazil’s most popular politician. I
stand with political and social leaders across the globe who are calling on
Brazil’s judiciary to release Lula and annul his conviction,” Senator Sanders
said.
We go now to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
to speak with the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Glenn Greenwald of The
Intercept, who broke the story.
So, Glenn, lay out what you exposed
in this three-part series. Looks like Glenn is having a
little trouble hearing us, so we’re going to go to break, and we’ll come back
to Glenn Greenwald in Rio de Janeiro. Stay with us.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: Damon Locks and Black Monument Ensemble
performing “Sounds Like Now.” This is Democracy Now!,
democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan
González. Our guest is Glenn Greenwald, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist,
founding editors of The Intercept, just published “The Secret Brazil
Archive,” a three-part exposé revealing that the judge overseeing the case
that put former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva behind bars
likely aided the federal prosecutors in their case against Lula and other
high-profile figures.
Lay out you found in this three-part
report, Glenn, and how it’s rocking Brazil right now.
GLENN GREENWALD: Sure. So, as your audience likely knows,
because I have discussed it with you many times and you’ve covered it with
other guests, Brazil is a country that has been swamped by multiple political
crises—the impeachment of former Workers’ Party President Dilma Rousseff, who
succeeded Lula, the ascension of this far-right President Jair Bolsonaro,
economic crises and the like.
But by far the biggest event in
Brazil was the imprisonment last year of former President Lula da Silva, not
just because he was such a giant on the world stage democratically, which he
is, because he was elected overwhelmingly twice, in 2002 and 2006, and his
presidency was so successful in lifting millions of people out of poverty, in
transforming Brazil, that he left Brazil and—left office, I mean, with an 87%
approval rating, which is unheard of. So, to put somebody like that in prison
is an earth-shattering story in and of itself, but it was made all the more
consequential by the fact that all polls showed that Lula, who was running
again for president last year—he was term-limited out of office the first
time—was the overwhelming favorite, was the massive front-runner, was ahead by
20 to 30 points in every poll, including ahead of Jair Bolsonaro. And so, to
imprison Lula meant that he was rendered ineligible under the law to run, and
that’s what paved the way ultimately for Jair Bolsonaro’s ascension to control
over Brazil, which is the fifth most populous country in the world, with massive
oil reserves and the most important environmental resource on the planet, which
is the Amazon, all of which is now in the hands of Jair Bolsonaro.
This was done by a task force
prosecutors and a judge, Sérgio Moro, who have basically been turned into superheroes,
into deities, by the Brazilian press and by the world press. Sérgio Moro was
heralded around the world as some great figure. He was named to the Time
100 list in 2016 and went to the gala in New York. He had a huge profile on him
on 60 Minutes that was a puff piece, basically turning him into this
noble anti-corruption figure. And there’s been almost no questioning of
anything that they’ve done, even though they’ve been using highly questionable
practices.
Here in Brazil, there has been a
longtime suspicion that they in fact were abusing their powers for political
ends, that what they really were, were right-wing ideologues and operatives who
were abusing the law to destroy the Workers’ Party—one of the only left-wing
parties in the entire democratic world that has dominated politics in a major
country and has succeeded in anti-poverty programs—in order to usher in the
pro-right faction into power, that they were abusing the law to basically put
the leaders in prison to destroy the party. They’ve always vehemently denied
this. They’ve said, “We have no ideology. We have no party preference. We don’t
care who wins elections. We’re only neutral judges and prosecutors applying the
law.”
The archive that was provided to us
by our source, this massive trove of secret documents, about their internal
communications, about their internal actions, their chats, their audios, their
videos, an archive that, as I’ve said, is bigger in size than the Snowden
archive was, which until that point was the largest leak in the history of U.S.
journalism, bigger than that, finally enables us to see the truth about what
they really did.
And the three stories that we
published on Sunday, the reason they’ve shaken Brazil to the core is because
Sérgio Moro, after Bolsonaro won, thanks to Justice Moro putting Lula in
prison, became the second most powerful person in Brazil, because Bolsonaro
created what he called a “super justice ministry,” that Sérgio Moro now runs.
He’s the justice minister of the country. It’s like being an attorney general
but on steroids, controlling all law enforcement, surveillance, police actions.
And what this material shows are
three key things. Number one, it shows that inside the prosecutor task force,
they were talking openly about how they wanted to make sure that the Workers’
Party lost the election. And we can talk about the specifics, but, in
particular, there was a judge who authorized Lula to give an interview from
prison 12 days before the election. And they panicked, and they said, “We need
to stop this, because if Lula is allowed to be heard from, he will—there’s a
good chance he will make PT win the election, and we need to put a stop to
this.” They said they were praying every day that PT doesn’t return to power—PT
being the Workers’ Party. So, this five-year claim that they had—”we don’t have
any preferences for parties, we don’t care who wins elections”—was an absolute
lie. They were talking openly and explicitly about how their top priority was
making sure PT didn’t win the election—exactly what people have been accusing
them of.
Secondly, just like in the U.S., a
judge is required to be neutral. A judge can’t favor one side or the other. And
there’s long been a suspicion that Judge Moro, when he was ruling on these
cases, like finding Lula guilty, finding other left-wing leaders guilty and
people from other parties guilty, that he was in fact collaborating in secret
with the prosecutors to design the case. They vehemently and angrily denied
this accusation. The head of the prosecutorial task force, who’s a national
hero in Brazil, Deltan Dallagnol, wrote a book in which he said, “These
accusations are outrageous. They’re disgusting.” We have video of Judge Moro
being asked about this, and he was so angry about it that he actually scoffed at
it with a smile, saying, “People talk about this as being—as though it’s Judge
Moro’s prosecution or Judge Moro’s strategy.” He said, “People don’t
understand. Judges in Brazil have no role in prosecuting people. Our value is
one of passivity. We simply listen to both sides, listen to the evidence and
make decisions.” What the conversations that we published show, between Judge
Moro and head of the prosecutorial task force, is that Judge Moro in fact was
constantly directing, constructing, designing the entire prosecution, screaming
at them when they were doing things that he thought were wrong, telling them
how to better fortify the case, not just against Lula, but against other
people. He was basically the commander of the prosecutorial team and then walking
into court as though he were sitting judging Lula’s case and others as a
neutral arbiter. So, everything that they vehemently denied to the public they
were doing, in fact, they were doing for years, as these documents show.
And the third key revelation, as you
said, is that the specific case for which they prosecuted Lula, namely the
charge that he had received a—what they call a triplex apartment, in order to
make it sound very glamorous, when in fact it’s kind of rundown and shoddy, and
Lula had the capability to buy it 100,000 times over if he wanted—but the
charge was he received this triplex apartment and renovations to it in exchange
for helping this construction company get contracts, that they knew themselves,
three days before they indicted him, that they didn’t have the evidence
sufficient to show his guilt or even to justify why this case belonged with
them. But they just decided they were going to go forward anyway, because they
knew they had a judge, in Judge Moro, now Minister Moro, single-mindedly
devoted to the goal of imprisoning Lula, and not just imprisoning him, but
doing so in time to make him ineligible to run for 2018’s election, out of fear
that PT would win the election.
So, the consequences of this
revelation have been enormous, because Moro, as I said, is the second most
powerful person in Brazil, after Bolsonaro, but he’s by far the most respected
person, or at least was the most respected person. And even his most ardent and
loyal defenders, in light of these revelations, have said there’s no way to
defend this conduct. One of the biggest right-wing newspapers in Brazil, Estado
de São Paulo, that has spent four years praising and heralding an
cheerleading for Sérgio Moro, came out and said he needs to resign, and the
head of the task force needs to be fired, just based on the first three stories
that we published. And that’s indicative and reflective of widespread
sentiment. And that’s why it’s shaking Brazil to the core, because Sérgio Moro
is crucial to the legitimacy of the Bolsonaro government.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, Glenn—
GLENN GREENWALD: Getting him to go join the government was a
crucial part.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Glenn, I wanted to ask you, because
these are, obviously, very explosive conclusions that you’ve reached on your
reporting. Could you talk a little bit about the archive sources that you have?
In other words, I could understand the cellphone texts, let’s say, between
different parties involved in this being leaked, but you were even talking
about audio. How was the audio compiled? Were these people taping their own
conversations? Could you discuss a little bit the nature of the documents that
you have?
GLENN GREENWALD: Sure. So, when I say audio, generally what I
mean is—and we haven’t published any of the audios yet, so I’m reluctant to say
much about them. But when I say audios, typically what I mean is not that they
were taping their own conversations, but that they often communicated with one
another using apps on telephones that enable you to either type out messages to
people, so you text messages to people, or you can leave voicemail messages for
people, essentially. So, instead of typing some long message, you just click
microphone on your telephone, you speak as a monologue, and you leave a message
that way on somebody else’s phone, which is a very common thing to do for
people who use WhatsApp or Telegram or Signal. Those are the kinds of audios
that I’m talking about. But because oftentimes, especially for complicated
matters, you don’t want to type huge paragraphs, you just want to speak, much
of their communications—although it’s not really technically taped, you end up
getting a huge part of their conversation, because they’re speaking to one
another in one-, two-, three-minute monologues back and forth to one another.
Those are the kinds of audios we have.
AMY GOODMAN: So, I wanted to turn to a video you tweeted
Monday of Sérgio Moro speaking in 2016. He was a federal judge at the time.
JUDGE SÉRGIO MORO: [translated] Let’s make something very clear.
You hear a lot about Judge Moro’s investigative strategy. I often say the
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Federal Police and the subsidiary bodies are
the ones responsible for that. I don’t have any investigative strategy at all.
The people who investigate or who decide what to do and such is the public
prosecutor and the Federal Police. The judge is reactive. We say that a judge
should normally cultivate these passive virtues. And I even get irritated at
times. I see somewhat unfounded criticism of my work, saying that I am a judge
investigator. I say go ahead and identify them. In my judicial decisions, a
decision where I determine the production of legal proof without provocation,
at most, I put together some documents for the eventual testimony of a witness.
In this large haul of criminal cases, that’s practically nothing.
AMY GOODMAN: And now I want to turn to former Brazilian
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in his own words, appearing on Democracy Now! in March
2018, just before he was jailed.
LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA: [translated] Now, if my innocence is proven,
then Judge Moro should be removed from his position, because you can’t have a
judge who is lying in the judgment and pronouncing as guilty someone who he
knows is innocent. He knows that it’s not my apartment. He knows that I didn’t
buy it. He knows that I didn’t pay anything. He knows that I never went there.
He knows that I don’t have money from Petrobras. The thing is that because he
subordinated himself to the media, I said, in the first hearing with him, “You
are not in a position to acquit me, because the lies have gone too far.” And
the disgrace is that the one who does the first lie continues lying and lying
and lying to justify the first lie. And I am going to prove that he has been
lying.
AMY GOODMAN: So, that is now-jailed former President Lula
da Silva. The Brazilian Bar Association has called for Moro to be suspended and
for all prosecutors involved in the scandal to be disbanded. Yet, as you’ve
pointed out, Bolsonaro made him a kind of super justice minister, bringing
together the functions of law enforcement, surveillance and investigation,
which were distributed to several ministries, all under Moro’s super justice
minister position, making him, as you pointed out, Glenn Greenwald, the second
most powerful person in Brazil now. So what happens?
GLENN GREENWALD: So, it’s so fascinating, Amy, because the
story reminds me so much of the Snowden story in so many ways. One way,
remember, that the Snowden story essentially began when Snowden heard James
Clapper go before the Senate and just look at them and just lie to their faces,
when he was asked, “Are you collecting data about millions of Americans?” and
he said, “No, sir, we’re not doing that. We have no such program.” And it was
shocking to Snowden to watch somebody in that high of a position so
sociopathically lie, and that’s the thing that finally drove Snowden to decide,
with finality, “I need to show the truth.” That’s the same reaction I have when
I listen to Judge Moro look in the cameras and say, “I get irritated at the
notion that I have any involvement in a prosecution,” when I’ve now read all of
the years’ worth of documents and conversations that we’ve—a lot of which we’ve
published, and will continue to publish, showing that he did exactly what he
looked in the camera, and with this smirk, and just so smugly denied. It’s just
amazing, even though I guess it shouldn’t be, the willingness of people in
these high positions of authority to so sociopathically lie about what it is
that they do.
And then the second issue is, you
know, just like in the Snowden story, where people for years suspected that the
NSA was spying, but were called conspiracy theorists or
paranoid people, and then the evidence proved them right, everybody—or, a lot
of people in Brazil have long said what Lula said—namely, that Moro got into a
position where he was forced to convict Lula, where he was single-mindedly obsessed
with it. The Brazilian elites were demanding that of him, and therefore he was
willing to do anything, including breaking rules, breaking laws, in order to
make that happen. They were called conspiracy theorists. They were called
paranoid. They were called left-wing liars and ideologues who were only saying
that to protect their leader. And as it turns out, what Lula said in that
interview is absolutely right.
And, of course, the conviction that
Sérgio Moro issued, notwithstanding the fact that it was very quickly, very
strangely quickly, affirmed by an appellate court, in time to make him
ineligible to run, is now called into doubt, because we know, because we’ve all
seen the evidence, that the process that led to his conviction was deeply and
inherently corrupted in the most basic way, because the person who found him
guilty was doing exactly that which judges are prohibited from doing. And the
Supreme Court will now decide whether that conviction can be maintained in
light of what we’ve shown.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Glenn, I wanted to ask you, in
a broader sense, this whole issue of corruption in government, and prosecutors
removing or being able to jail or remove elected officials or key political
leaders—clearly, in a democracy, in an industrial or Western democracy, there’s
two ways to remove a leader: You vote them out of office, or you get them
indicted and jailed and removed that way. To what extent is this a signal to
people around the world, in other countries, about the kind of skepticism that
you should have about investigations coming at the top leaders? And, of course,
I’m sure there are people in the—Trump supporters here in this country, who
would point to the FBI agent Peter Strzok and Lisa
Page, the FBI counsel, as they were attempting to help
remove Trump from office. But to what degree do you—is this a warning for
people in other countries to be wary and skeptical, even in the face of what
seems initially to be damning evidence against a political leader?
GLENN GREENWALD: Yeah, I mean, look, Juan, you know, as you
know, as you guys know, I’ve been one of the people, along with Noam Chomsky
and Matt Taibbi and a few lonely others on the left, who have been skeptical of
the Russiagate story, in part because we know that these agencies have a long
history of lying. And the FBI and the CIA
and the NSA in the U.S. were vehemently opposed to
Donald Trump and wanted Hillary Clinton, because they trusted her much more.
And so there was a concern always, on my part, that they were abusing their prosecutorial
powers to interfere in our domestic election in the United States in order to
help the candidate they wanted to win and hurt the candidate that they wanted
to lose. There were other factions in the FBI, by the
way, who wanted Donald Trump to win desperately, and did their own abuse of
power to hurt Hillary Clinton’s chances and help Donald Trump win. So there
were two different factions inside these law enforcement agencies interfering
in the U.S. election by abusing their power to help the two candidates they
preferred, which is an incredible—that was the real meddling that was dangerous
in the 2016 election.
And, of course, the parallel is very
clear, which is that in Brazil, since 2002, the center-right, the oligarchical
class, which, by the way, got kind of comfortable with Lula and PT, but
nonetheless still wanted the center-right to be in power—and I asked Lula about
that: “Why would the elite be so opposed to you, when the elite thrived under
your presidency? Even though you lifted millions of people out of poverty, you
weren’t a socialist. You weren’t Castro. You weren’t Chávez.” The markets in
Brazil, the rich in Brazil prospered under Lula. And he said it was cultural.
They hated the fact that somebody who came from poverty was in the presidency,
who doesn’t speak perfect Portuguese, who didn’t read until he was 10. They
hated seeing in airports people who used to be invisible in the favelas now
able to fly to visit their family, to be able to buy apartments. They hated it
culturally. They felt like their Brazil was being taken away from them. And so,
they couldn’t beat Lula, they couldn’t beat the Workers’ Party democratically,
and so they abused the force of law in order to destroy the party that they
couldn’t beat politically. And this is a serious warning and a serious danger
about why anytime people in power exercise power in secret, we need to be
skeptical of them—all human beings.
And I believe that these prosecutors
began with good intentions. Brazil really is a country that has been plagued by
corruption, on the left and the right, for a long time. They’re young people.
They’re in their thirties. I believe they began with good intentions. But they
became so drunk on their own power. Nobody was questioning them. The large
media here in Brazil, with the exception of Folha, one newspaper,
stopped questioning what they were doing, just applauded for them, served as
their tool. When you have that kind of faith being put into you, that kind of
unquestioned power, as I’m not hardly the first person to observe, that kind of
power corrupts people. And they got corrupted. They became politicized. And
they became drunk on their own belief in their own goodness, that they thought
they were above the law and could break the rules, because their ends justified
the means. And it is an important lesson to learn about power in general.
AMY GOODMAN: And, of course, they ousted, impeached Dilma
Rousseff, before they imprisoned Lula. Finally, Glenn, very quickly, you’ve got
this three-part series. It’s rocking Brazil right
now—calls for Moro to go down, the super justice minister; calls for Lula to be
released. What do you think is the chance of this? And finally, you’re saying
this is larger than a Snowden cache of information. You have much more
information that you haven’t released. What are you doing with it?
GLENN GREENWALD: We are working feverishly to publish it as
quickly as we can. Obviously, you know, there is a lot of desire to see more of
it, but we have a responsibility, just like we did with the Snowden case, to
make sure that what we’re publishing is done well and professionally and
accurately, because if we make a single mistake, they’ll use that forever
against us to undermine the credibility of the reporting. But definitely more
is coming, very soon.
So, when you ask what’s going to
happen with Moro, what’s going to happen with Lula, a lot of it depends on how
good of the reporting we do and how much more we show, which we have a lot more
to show. But I believe, even with just what we’ve shown—I’m not saying Sérgio
Moro is about to be put out of office, because he still has the support of
Bolsonaro. He’s still crucial to the government. But certainly he’s severely
damaged and weakened, and will continue to be more damaged and weakened as we
reveal more. I’m not sure he can survive that. But I do think there’s a good
chance that the Supreme Court will say that the conviction of Lula da Silva was
a byproduct of so much impropriety that we cannot let it stand, that at the
very least he needs a new trial and needs to be let out of prison while this
new trial proceeds.
AMY GOODMAN: Glenn Greenwald, we want to thank you for
being with us, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, one of the founding editors
of The Intercept, has just published “The Secret Brazil Archive.”
We’ll link to it at democracynow.org.
When we come back, we look at the
horrific conditions for immigrants in for-profit detention jails around the
United States with Aura Bogado. Stay with us.
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